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Abstract: Competitiveness is not only an economic matter; it is also a foreign policy issue. It 
requires the coordinated action of the state, business community and civil society. Global 
economic institutions now confront a new challenge to design strategies and roadmaps for 
reform that will build on the achievements of the past, and cope with an increasingly new set 
of ripples that poses risks to the orthodox practice of development and ignite a search for a new 
kind of diplomacy. A global dialogue on competitiveness and economic development is in the 
making, and small economies have a vested interest to be part of that dialogue. While small 
states have fewer resources to devote to the tasks of diplomacy and effective interaction with 
other states, this shortcoming can be reduced by alliances and networks, given the large number 
of small states with common interests. Small states in Europe are strategically placed to 
recalibrate that continent’s approach to regional and international diplomacy in its quest to 
promote competitiveness, and sustain growth and equity in its development goals. As such, it 
can bring important lessons to the attention of other small states in the world and add 
considerably to the expectations of this exercise in global analytical leadership. 
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Introduction 
In the new geopolitics of today, there has been an “outpouring of anxiety over the future of the 
liberal order” (Acharya, 2017). The spillover of this anxiety has opened a dialogue on the “new 
globalisation” in a period of protectionism, weakening multilateralism, and a political assault 
on global competitiveness. Acharya (2017, p.271) sums up the political architecture of the 
emerging multiplex world order as follows, 
 
[I]nternational relations scholars should be wary of conventional wisdom and be open 
to new concepts and theories, and hence to new possibilities of world order that have 
no precedent in history… where scholars and practitioners alike will have to embrace 
the complexities of this new system. 
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The latest Global Competitiveness Report states that “governments, businesses, and individuals 
are experiencing high levels of uncertainty as technology and geopolitical forces reshape the 
economic and political order that has underpinned international relations and economic policy 
for the past 25 years” (The Global Competitiveness Report, 2018, p. v). These insights provide 
the setting for discovering new possibilities for small state diplomacy in improving small state 
competitiveness and economic advancement in an uncertain economic order. 
 
Competitiveness is not only an economic matter; it is also a foreign policy issue. The Global 
Competitiveness Report (2018) affirmed that “improving competitiveness requires the 
coordinated action of the state, the business community and civil society.” Further, the report 
explains that uncertainty among government, business and individuals is being driven by 
geopolitical forces which have reshaped the economic and political order with implications for 
international relations and economic policy. Competitiveness determines a country’s global 
influence and its ability to shape the international dialogue, and is the set of institutions, policies 
and factors that determines the level of productivity of a country (Global Competitiveness 
Report, 2018). A competitive economy is productive, and productivity leads to growth and 
higher incomes and improved standards of living for all. Global economic institutions must 
now confront a new quest to design strategies and roadmaps for reform that will build on the 
achievements of the past, and cope with an increasingly new set of ripples that poses risks to 
the orthodox practice of development and ignite a search for a new kind of diplomacy. A global 
dialogue is in the making, and small economies have a vested interest in being part of that 
dialogue. 
 
In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Sustainable Development 
Agenda, along with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets which 
cover the economic, social and environmental aspects of sustainable development (United 
Nations 2015). While all countries and stakeholders are expected to act collaboratively to 
implement this roadmap, with a central theme of “no one left behind”, small states face their 
own unique challenges that threaten the achievement of the SDGs (United Nations, 2015). 
Alicia Barcena called for “revitalising multilateralism” to promote the 2030 Agenda, and it is 
at the cornerstone of small states voice and influence in accepting collective responsibility for 
global challenges (Bárcena, 2017). The World Bank in their recent presentation “Small States: 
A Roadmap for World Bank Group engagement” has explained that these challenges include 
building resilience to climate change, diversifying their economic base, and developing new 
systems to generate and attract public and private finance (World Bank, 2017).  
 
Small economies lack adequate financial resources for achieving the SDGs, while at the same 
time there have been new challenges for them in accessing development finance from the 
international community (World Bank, 2017). Additionally, the World Bank’s ‘ease of doing 
business’ index is a key indicator in attracting international investment and countries including 
small states are ranked against each other. The appropriateness of the index in measuring 
competitiveness in small states, and the amount of information provided by the index on small 
states has been questioned (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007) and, more recently, the integrity 
of the index has come under scrutiny (The Economist, 2018). Moreover, small nations are 
generally more sensitive to and more impacted by international developments, but at the same 
time have benefitted more from globalisation (Spolaore, 2018).  
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Recently, there are indicators that the international economic and political environment has 
become less supportive of globalisation, which may negatively impact small states (Spolaore, 
2018; Dookeran, 2018). It is therefore not only a technical dialogue to come up with solutions 
to these challenges, but also a diplomatic dialogue, since diplomatic interventions are 
necessary, within global institutions and in the global policy frameworks that are being 
developed. Diplomatic intervention is an important tool available to small states that can 
improve their global competitiveness standing (Dookeran, 2018). While small states have 
fewer resources to devote to the tasks of diplomacy and effective interaction with other states, 
this shortcoming can be reduced given their large number and common interests through the 
formation of alliances and networks (Estevadeordal & Goodman, 2017). Further, European 
small states are strategically positioned in regional and international diplomacy to promote a 
global competitiveness and growth agenda where small states are not left behind (Dookeran, 
2018) with special conditions for their participation in international affairs, and years of 
experience in participating in international institutions (Pedersen, 1984).   
 
This paper explores small state diplomacy in affecting international competitiveness with 
reference to European small states. The concept of small state diplomacy is defined and three 
current issues affecting competitiveness and diplomacy are explored: small states access to 
development finance; competitiveness measures; and threats to globalisation and small state 
alliances and networks. The paper comprises four sections, including this introduction. Section 
2 defines and outlines small state diplomacy. Section 3 looks at the three current issues in 
international diplomacy and small states. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
Small State Diplomacy  
 
Small states operate in the same political and economic environment as large states, and in their 
foreign policy pursue the same objectives of security, prosperity, and wellbeing of their citizens 
and conduct their diplomacy using the same diplomatic toolbox as large states. The 
international system contains many small states, which form an integral part of the international 
order (Keohane, 2009). The number of small states increased significantly in the twentieth 
century, with the end of both World Wars, the decolonisation process in the 1960s and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Veenendaal & Corbett, 2014; Kassimeris, 2009). About 
two-thirds of the member states of the United Nations are small states. In the European Union 
(EU), there are (at the time of writing) 28 members and 7 are small states (Thorhallsson & 
Wivel, 2006). In other words, small states make up 25 percent of EU membership. Small states 
are here defined as states with a resident population of three million or less. In the European 
Union, they include Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia 
(Thorhallsson & Wivel, 2006). Small states are, therefore, well represented within the EU and 
the international community, and can influence regional and world politics (Henrikson, 2008). 
Diplomatic means can transform the smallness of small states into an asset when promoting 
national and international interests (Dookeran, 2018).  
 
Small states have fewer resources to devote to the tasks of diplomacy and effective interaction 
with other states (Henrikson 2008). This includes resources required for gathering and 
analysing relevant information, for elaborating and projecting positions and points of view, and 
for organising and deploying alignments and circumstances in support of their positions. 
Although their limited resources can put small states in a weaker bargaining position in their 
interactions with large states, this disadvantage can be reduced, given the large number of small 
states with common interests (Estevadeordal & Goodman, 2017). This may require reliance on 
collective solidarity and the rule of law, strict focus on limited objectives, and the adoption of 
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creative solutions (Dookeran, 2018). The role of small states in various multilateral 
negotiations confirms that small and cohesive groups can have an important effect. For 
example, the Neutral and Non-Aligned (N+N) countries in the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in climate 
negotiations, and the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs) group in the World Trade 
Organisation DOHA round (Panke, 2012). 
 
The characteristics of small states influence how they operate in the international system. The 
characteristics of small states including their small size, openness and proneness to natural 
disasters and vulnerability to climate change influence the issues they deem important (World 
Bank, 2018). The effects of small state actions on the international order tend to be more 
focused (Kassimeris, 2009). Small states are attracted to the notions of legitimacy and the rule 
of law (Pollard, 2007). They recognise the valuable role that multilateral diplomacy plays in 
enhancing their engagement and amplifying their voices on regional or global issues, thus 
levelling the playing field (Henrikson, 2008). Nevertheless, the many complex structures and 
processes of multilateral diplomacy strain their resources. 
 
Diplomatic Issues in Global Competitiveness  
 
Accessing Development Finance 
 
Financial vulnerabilities are a threat to competitiveness, and threaten a nation’s ability to 
finance innovation, spread the benefits of technological adoption and provide worker 
protection in a flexible labour market (World Bank, 2017). The World Bank Roadmap for small 
states specifically linked financing to competitiveness by carefully identifying seven priority 
action areas, in which there is need for the development of a global practice: inclusion of 
vulnerability as a criterion for concessional financing; predictability of affordable financing; 
debt sustainability; access to new and existing climate financing; capacity building and 
technical assistance; diversification of small state economies; and access to financial markets 
(World Bank, 2017). Diplomatic interventions for the benefit of small states can play an 
important role here within the global dialogue, global institutions and the global policy 
frameworks that are being framed on development finance (Dookeran, 2018).  
 
In July 2015, at the Third International Conference on Financing for Development, 
development finance entered a new era when the international community agreed to the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA): a framework and set of commitments for financing the SDGs, 
which require far more funding than aid can provide. Meeting the SDGs will require an 
additional US$ 2.5 trillion in private and public financing per year and an additional US$ 13.5 
trillion to implement the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP21) Paris 
climate accord (UNCTAD, 2014). The World Bank, together with other multilateral 
development banks and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), committed to use billions in 
investment funding, aid, and grants, in innovative ways to increase development finance 
(World Bank 2017). It is imperative that small nations including EU states are able to access 
these funds successfully, and diplomatic channels can play a key role here (Dookeran, 2018).  
 
In seeking development finance, small states – including European small states – may consider 
taking into account their vulnerability and seek preferential access to concessional finance 
(Dookeran, 2018). Given their small populations, limited geographies and the difficulties to 
diversify, small states are particularly vulnerable to external shocks. This vulnerability hinders 
small states’ capacity to progress towards the SDGs. Small states must also seek the 
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predictability of affordable financing. Despite acute vulnerabilities to shocks, small states are 
ineligible for concessional financing because of their high per capita incomes. Debt 
sustainability is another urgent matter facing small states (Bustillo et al., 2018). Vulnerability 
to natural disasters, with high costs of recovery, contributes to small states’ indebtedness. In 
addition, limited fiscal space, narrow potential for domestic revenue generation, and the high 
costs of public services typically exacerbate debt burdens (Bustillo et al., 2018). Because of 
these debts, small states may not be able to access concessional or market financing (Dookeran, 
2018). 
 
Small states would do well to invest in building resilience and diversify their economies to 
lessen their vulnerability, manage their debt burdens and attract private sector financing 
(Bustillo et al., 2018). Accessing new and existing climate financing is also recommended. 
Although the international community is giving high priority to climate adaptation and 
mitigation, small states have difficulty accessing the vast pool of climate funds (World Bank, 
2017). Additionally, capacity building and technical assistance in small states must be 
developed. Many small states face limited human, institutional, and implementation capacity 
to carry out tasks needed to absorb development finance and implement the investments 
necessary to address their vulnerability and lack of resilience. Donor fragmentation in small 
states hinders the effective use of financing for achieving development outcomes (World Bank, 
2017). 
 
The World Bank Roadmap identified financial deepening of the private sector – the cascade 
approach and blended finance approaches – as relevant to enhancing competitiveness strategies 
in small states in Europe, designed to support progress towards the SDGs at the Third 
International Conference on Financing for Development in 2015 (World Bank, 2017). Blended 
finance is described as the strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to 
mobilise private capital flows to emerging and frontier markets resulting in positive results for 
both “investors and communities” (World Bank, 2017, p.16). It offers the possibility to scale 
up commercial financing for developing countries and to channel such financing toward 
investments with development impact. The increasing emphasis on blended finance approaches 
evokes the need to increase the understanding and transparency of these flows. 
 
The World Bank adopted the cascade approach as a concept to guide its effort to leverage the 
private sector for growth and sustainable development. The guidelines on how to implement 
the cascade are very clear.  When a project is presented, ask: is there a sustainable private sector 
solution that limits public debt and contingent liabilities? If the answer is yes, promote such 
private solutions. If the answer is no, then ask whether it is because of policy gaps, regulatory 
gaps or their weakness. If so, provide World Bank support for policy and regulatory reforms, 
then assess the risks and see whether World Bank instruments can address them. If you 
conclude that the project still requires public funding, only then pursue that option (World 
Bank, 2017). 
 
The mandate of the International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the World Bank Group is 
to enhance financial flows for small economies. Capital flows, and their direction and 
sustainability, are key to building resilience for the economies of small states around the world. 
Some of the criteria to be considered here include: the predictability of affordable financing; 
debt sustainability; access to financial markets; and economic diversification. With respect to 
deepening private sector involvement, the report says, 
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International Finance Corporation is committed to helping expand the limited set of 
economic opportunities leveraging the full weight of resources of the World Bank 
group. Ensuring obstacles for the poor and the bottom 40 percent of the population to 
access these economic opportunities are reduced (World Bank, 2017, p. 16). 
 
Small state economies tend to suffer from limited export diversification and productive 
capacities (World Bank, 2017). A lack of economic diversity leaves small states dependent on 
the economic and political situations of neighbouring transit countries, and vulnerable to 
economic and climate shocks. Small states must enhance their capacity to attract, manage and 
invest with both concessional and private sector resources. Access to financial markets poses 
a risk to small states (World Bank, 2017). Large financial entities are effectively cutting ties 
between banks in small states and global finance. A decline in correspondent banking 
relationships is having damaging results at the individual and community levels, particularly 
by affecting remittances and complicating the provision of domestic and cross-border payments 
(Alleyne et al., 2017; Alwazir et al., 2017). 
 
At the 17th annual Small States Forum held in October 2017 in Washington DC, 50 small states 
banded together and were able to successfully increase their development finance allocation 
from the World Bank four-fold after active diplomacy. Members of the Forum welcomed the 
World Bank’s May 2017 Roadmap for engagement with small states (Small States Forum, 
2017). The challenge now is to find transformative projects that can absorb and make the most 
of these extra resources. The Forum also highlighted the importance of mobilising public and 
private sector financing for renewable energy, the green and blue economy, and technology 
development in building resilience and reducing vulnerability in small countries. 
 
Some small states which are vulnerable to natural disasters, such as Nauru and Palau, do not 
qualify for the small states exception from the International Development Association because 
they are classified as high income countries, or meet the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development’s credit standards and are therefore unable to access resources for clean-up 
and relief. The 2017 Small States Forum successfully lobbied for the World Bank to explore 
financing solutions for countries in this category (Small States Forum, 2017).  
 
Financial institutions are seeking to ‘de-risk’, and are leading to the withdrawal of 
correspondent banking relationships in small states, resulting in financial exclusion from the 
international community. The 2017 Small States Forum proposed establishing a working group 
to address the development challenges of de-risking in small states and to provide a systematic 
and comprehensive response and to explore possible solutions, including Blockchain 
technology (Small States Forum, 2017). Malta, now dubbed ‘Blockchain Island’ (Holotescu, 
2018), has an opportunity to play a leadership role here for other small states. At the same time, 
it has been recently accused by the EU of failing to correctly supervise financial institutions 
and ensure their compliance with anti-money laundering rules. In November 2018, the 
European Commission required the Maltese Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit to: improve 
its methodology to assess money laundering and terrorist financing risks; enhance its 
monitoring and supervisory strategy; ensure that the authority is able to react in an appropriate 
time when a weakness is identified; ensure that its decision-making is properly reasoned and 
documented; and adopt systematic and detailed record-keeping processes (European 
Commission, 2018). 
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Competitiveness Measures and Integrity 
 
One of the flagship economic reports that measures business competitiveness rankings is the 
World Bank’s ‘ease of doing business’ index. A higher ranking (lower numerical value) 
indicates that the regulatory environment is more conducive to starting and operating a local 
business. These indicators carry considerable attention in investment attractiveness, and 
include regulatory hurdles, tax and exchange rate issues, and other measures that make a 
“better” business environment and improve competitiveness (Dookeran, 2018). The index 
attracts extensive international media coverage and its findings are used by countries against 
each other to improve their competitiveness standing (Dookeran, 2018). It may however be 
argued that the ‘ease of doing business’ index is inappropriate for measuring competitiveness 
in small states, provides limited information on competitiveness in small states, 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007), and most recently has been accused of political 
interference bringing the integrity of the index into question (Dookeran, 2018; Morck & Shou, 
2018). 
 
The ‘ease of doing business’ index has been criticised on technical grounds, with flaws in its 
definition of competitiveness, model specification, variable choice, causal relationships and 
use of data. Focus on particular sectors rather than the economy as a whole using a smaller 
number of critical variables may be more appropriate in small states (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2007). The rankings are determined via a methodology which sorts the aggregate 
distance to frontier scores on 10 topics (starting a business, dealing with construction permits, 
getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying 
taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency) (The Global 
Competitiveness Report, 2018). Each topic consists of several indicators, giving equal weight 
to each topic. The method entails answering measurable questions, and the answers determine 
a country’s score, and its score, relative to those of other countries, determines its global rank 
and bragging rights. 
 
Critics argue that the index is limited in scope since it focuses on 10 topics, with the specific 
aim of measuring the regulation and red tape relevant to domestic small to medium-size firms 
(Morck and Shou, 2018). Accordingly, the index does not measure all aspects of the business 
environment that matter to firms and investors and all factors that affect competitiveness. The 
index does not for instance measure security, macroeconomic stability, corruption, quality of 
institutions and infrastructure, and foreign investment regulations. As an alternative, the 
Commonwealth Secretariat developed the Small State Manufactured Export Competitiveness 
Index (SSMECI) (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2007). The SSMECI focuses on basic economic 
fundamentals including macroeconomic stability, outward oriented trade policy, high levels of 
human capital and efficient infrastructure and is deemed more appropriate than the 200 sub-
indices in the ‘ease of doing business’ index. It emphasises the ability to produce manufactures 
competitively in small economies. The SSMECI however does not have the same international 
recognition as the ‘ease of doing business’ index. 
 
The ‘ease of doing business’ index covers around 190 jurisdictions, but includes less than 
twenty small states; while the SSMECI covers 47 small states, including the 7 EU small states. 
A large number of small states are excluded from this index, largely because the data 
requirements for calculating the index are huge and the data simply do not exist in these 
countries. Small states have small populations and often underdeveloped national statistical 
systems and institutions; they therefore can lack the capacity and demand to collect the 
extensive data required. Having an appropriate index to measure competitiveness in small 
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states allows for proper benchmarking of small states against each other (that is, countries with 
similar characteristics) and provides a yardstick to measure performance. Small states at the 
lower end of the ranking could then emulate and learn from the experience and policy strategies 
implemented by small states at the higher end of the ranking. The SSMECI is constructed 
taking into account the data availability in small states and realistic data requirements. Malta 
and Estonia top the rankings because of their greater access to markets and the positive effect 
of sustained competitive pressure from their large European members, and as such provide 
appropriate benchmarks for small countries seeking to improve their competitiveness.  
 
An article in The Economist (2018) calls into question the integrity of the ‘ease of doing 
business’ index and its accompanying reports. The article explains that the compilation of the 
‘ease of doing business’ index may have been tainted by the political motivations of World 
Bank staff (The Economist, 2018). The story was based on an interview with Paul Romer, the 
World Bank’s Chief Economist, who pointed out that Chile’s ranking in the yearly report had 
dropped sharply during the presidency of President Michelle Bachelet, a left-leaning politician 
who took office for the second time in 2014 (Reuters,  2018; The Economist, 2018; Zumbrun 
& Talley, 2018). In small states, with weaker institutions and institutional frameworks and lack 
of data, the possibility of political interference may be even larger.  
 
To move the pendulum forward, the technical analysis will need to build a momentum for 
effective results. The Global Competitiveness Report recently developed a proposal on “the 
future of competitiveness benchmarking” which offers an opening for technical negotiations 
and conceptual innovations in the design challenges (Dookeran, 2018).  This index is a valuable 
measure of how a country is progressing to build structures and processes to support policy 
initiatives on a global competitiveness framework. As such, the search for diplomatic 
interventions becomes necessary, within global institutions and in the global policy 
frameworks that are being framed, and small states have a role to play.  
 
A global dialogue is in the making with regards to the ‘ease of doing business’ index and 
measuring competitiveness, and small economies have a vested interest to be part of that 
dialogue. Small states could coordinate to improve the appropriateness, integrity and 
objectivity of international competitiveness indices. It is therefore not only a technical 
dialogue, but also a matter of diplomacy. In an often cited publication, Long (2017) argued that 
“small states can influence institutional rules and procedures….just as for rules shaped by 
greater powers”. Many scholars argue that “small states can “punch above their weight”, and 
“Luxembourg has been a founding model member of European institutions, and it has used this 
to pressure for favourable EU policies, while seeking to strengthen institutions as a bulwark 
against historic German French rivalry” (Long, 2017). Allegrezza (2017) draws attention to the 
“competitiveness observatory” set up by the social partners in Luxembourg and the 
measurement of the competitiveness scoreboard which was discussed in “a special 
parliamentary session” on competitiveness and growth. 
 
Threats to Globalisation and Alliances and Networks  
 
Small nations are generally more sensitive to and possibly more affected by developments in 
the international system, which can impact their competitiveness (Spolaore, 2018). Small 
nations are more vulnerable, and the economics of their situation is precarious. The workings 
of the global system, particularly the globalisation of business, may harm their competitiveness 
even while promoting their freedom. After several decades of an international economic and 
political environment that has been highly supportive of globalisation, there are indications of 
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meaningful change (Spolaore, 2018; Rodrik, 2018; Llunji, 2015). There are threats to 
globalisation, a rise of populist policies and increased geopolitical pressure (Dookeran, 2018). 
This new international environment is likely to pose a challenge to small economies and their 
international competitiveness. The international community, a large part of which is now made 
up of small states, should be prepared to act, for the global public good, as well as out of sheer 
political and also environmental self‐interest, to help safeguard the livelihood of the world’s 
many and varied small states. Small state diplomacy can play an important role here.  
 
In Europe, there is political backlash against international integration both globally and within 
the EU as demonstrated by Brexit and the rise of anti-European political movements (Rodrik, 
2018; Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Critics have argued that institutional integration in Europe 
has gone too far and that the euro has failed, and Brexit is seen as the first step towards 
European disintegration (Spolaore, 2018). Furthermore, the immigration crisis may lead to the 
return of permanent barriers within Europe (Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017). On the other hand, 
supporters of European integration attribute the current economic, financial, and political crises 
to incomplete integration, and seek further integration through a banking union, fiscal union 
and full political union (Spolaore, 2018). The European integration dilemma involves high 
economies of scale from commercial integration, common immigration policies, common legal 
system, common defence and security, but also high heterogeneity from different preferences, 
beliefs, and values in large and diverse populations (Spolaore, 2018). 
 
Small nations have benefited from increasing international openness. They thrive in an 
economically integrated world, while they are disproportionately hurt by international barriers. 
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) empirically demonstrate that conditional correlation between 
international openness and economic growth for larger countries is 0.150 as against 0.641 for 
smaller countries. This suggests that while international openness is beneficial on average for 
countries of all sizes, it is especially beneficial for small countries. The Commonwealth 
Secretariat, with small states as the majority of its members including Cyprus and Malta, carries 
out policy analysis, consultations and global advocacy to promote the international trade 
interests of these countries. As a result, trade between Commonwealth countries has seen 
phenomenal growth termed the “Commonwealth effect”, rising from US $200 billion in 2000 
to more than US $600 billion in 2015 and projected to surpass $1 trillion by 2020 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2015). 
 
Regional public goods have once again been cited as important in the context of twenty first 
century international relations. Heterogeneous preferences negatively affect the provision of 
public goods which are non-rival in consumption and must be shared by all within a 
jurisdiction. In contrast, diversity of preferences and traits come with benefits when 
considering interactions about rival goods. Egan (2017) traced the pivotal role of European 
public goods in the foundations of European integration. The range of these public goods 
include competition policy and market access, common external tariff and trade matters, 
transportation and cross border services, environment and negative externalities, economic 
convergence and income and wealth disparities, macroeconomic stabilisation and the euro, and 
internal security and border control (Estevadeordal and Goodman, 2017). Egan (2017, p. 256) 
concluded that “despite the growing chorus of disenchantment in Europe with the concerns for 
inequality, productivity and migration there remains a role for regional organisations to act as 
catalysts for collective action by providing regional public goods.” But Egan (2017, p. 258) 
hastens to add that it “can also weaken democratic institutions and can collapse trust in 
European institutions.” 
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“Small states have a greater capacity to influence the agenda in world politics and play a critical 
role in the evolution of European integration than is commonly understood” (Long, 2017, p. 
9). Inside European institutions, small states can construct a “position of authority” through 
diplomacy by influencing the “rules and voting procedure” (Long, 2017, p. 9). In this sense, 
small state diplomacy is an essential component for advancing its interest in global 
competitiveness. Estevadeordal and Goodman (2017) argue that regional leadership alliances 
and networks fit together to link public goods with sustainability and, with Acharya (2017), 
called for a new conceptualisation of regionalism that will embrace more complex situations 
in a changing “balance of power”.  
 
Small states can coordinate actions to counterbalance current threats to international integration 
and globalisation, as they have done in the past on monumental international issues, since they 
are less constrained by political alliances and direct national interests, championing ideas that 
have led to major international agreements (Súilleabháin, 2014). Further, decolonisation, the 
end of bipolarity, democratisation, trade liberalisation and the digital revolution are five factors 
that have given small states more freedom (Henrikson, 2001). In addition, small countries may 
find it easier to respond to citizen preferences in a democratic way (Alesina & Spolaore, 2003). 
Could small states shift global economic structures to favour their interest? Would small states 
benefit from open trade systems? How could small states overcome their ‘smallness’ and 
develop diplomatic leverage? These and other relevant questions addressed in the work of 
Henrikson (2001) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003) provide a critical body of thought that 
informs the agenda of small state diplomacy and competitiveness in today’s world.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that competitiveness is not only an economic matter, but also a foreign 
policy issue. Competitiveness determines a country’s global influence and its ability to shape 
the international dialogue. It requires the coordinated action of the state, business community 
and civil society. Three global issues with implications for competitiveness, and where it is 
crucial for small states to have a voice, are: accessing development finance; measuring 
competitiveness; and a changing international political and economic environment that is not 
as supportive of globalisation as in the past. Small nations are generally more sensitive to and 
more impacted by such international developments and at the same time benefit from an 
economically integrated world, and are disproportionately negatively affected by international 
barriers. It is not only a technical dialogue to come up with solutions to these challenges, but a 
diplomatic dialogue is also necessary within the global institutions and global policy 
frameworks that are being developed.  
A global dialogue is in the making, and small states are not to be left behind. Diplomatic 
intervention is an important tool available to small states which can improve their global 
competitiveness. While small states have fewer resources to devote to the tasks of diplomacy 
and effective interaction with other states, this shortcoming can be compensated by their large 
number and common interests through the formation of alliances and networks. Although it 
may appear that small states have failed to form alliances and networks, progress has in fact 
been made as shown with the Small States Forum in improving access to development finance 
and de-risking in small states, and the Commonwealth Secretariat with increasing international 
trade and developing a new competitiveness measure for small states. This progress has been 
made with different degrees of success or not the level of success anticipated, which makes the 
point that more could be done.  
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The fact remains that there is limited space in the global negotiating agenda for the issues that 
small states represent. Small states in Europe are strategically placed to bring these issues 
forward at the regional EU level and through the EU at the international level, and to recalibrate 
its approach to regional and international diplomacy in its quest to promote competitiveness, 
and sustain growth and equity in its development goals. As such, it can bring important lessons 
to the attention of other small nations in the world and add considerably to the expectations of 
this exercise in global analytical leadership. 
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